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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
NEW MYTHS AND OLD REALITIES

Charles Wolf, Jr.

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

NEW MYTHS AND OLD REALITIES

Charles Wolf, Jr.

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

I. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF POPULAR SUPPORT

whose doctrine? The core of currently accepted doctrine about insurgency is the dominant role ascribed to popular attitudes, loyalties, and support in the process by which insurgent movements get started, gain momentum, and erupt in "liberation wars." The doctrine is not usually so overdrawn as to assign the full burden of explanation to popular support. International politics, external assistance, and military factors, are also acknowledged to play a role. But these roles are subsidiary and permissive. According to current doctrine, the primary, activating force behind insurgency movements lies in popular attitudes and animus, the erosion of mass support for established institutions, and the gaining of popular support and commitment by the insurgency. In the same manner, current doctrine contends that successful counterinsurgency programs require that support be won from the insurgents by the established government. ? NO

Certain key phrases reflect the mood of the prevailing doctrine: the familiar "fish-in-the-sea" analogy; the view that insurgency and counterinsurgency are "political, social, and economic rather than *whose quote?* military problems;" the claim that insurgency and counterinsurgency are "struggles for men's minds, rather than territory." These are the phrases and metaphors used to describe and analyze insurgency by practitioners like Mao, Giap, and Guevara.* They are also NO

* For Mao, guerrilla warfare is a special case of the general proposition that: "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts," Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 192, International Publishers, New York, 1954

However, to keep the picture properly balanced, it is worth noting that Mao is also the originator of the aphorism that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," ibid., p. 272.

the terms in which the problem is formulated by experts and analysts, like Bernard Fall and George Tanham, and political commentators like Walter Lippmann.

The central role of popular support is usually tied in closely with the contention that various types of economic and social programs can prevent the loss of popular support by the established institutions, or win popular support away from the insurgency. In this form, the prevailing doctrine ^{is one of the principle themes pervading} ~~pervades~~ both policy pronouncements and journalistic reporting of insurgency. For example, the doctrine was clearly expressed by one of the senior officials in the Agency for International Development in recent testimony on the Foreign Assistance Act:

The [counterinsurgency] concept essentially rests on the assumption that this kind of war depends heavily upon the psychology of the peasant, his attitude toward his government, and toward his future. If we can quickly demonstrate to him the prospect of improvement in his livelihood, in his children's future, then he will not be vulnerable to the propaganda and terror of the insurgents.*

Along the same lines, a staff writer for the Wall Street Journal reported and endorsed this view of the war in Vietnam in the summer of 1964.

Most American observers in South Vietnam say that if the U.S.-backed war against Communist insurgents is to make any progress, the Saigon regime must win the loyalty and confidence of the residents of the Vietnamese countryside. And the only way to achieve this goal, these Americans assert, is for the government to convince the 15 million citizens of South Vietnam that it can solve long-neglected social and economic problems and improve drab-substandard living conditions.*

Representing the views on Vietnam of at least part of the American scientific community, an editorial comment in the Bulletin of the

* Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, April 1964, p. 208.

** Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1964, p. 1.

Atomic Scientists recently observed that:

It [the war in Vietnam] is a guerrilla war, and the winning of such a war requires the allegiance, or at least the passive support, of the population. This has been conspicuously absent for the obvious reason that South Vietnam has not had and is not getting a government in contact with its people.*

These quotations reflect a style of thinking, a pattern of belief, about insurgency and counterinsurgency problems that is as pervasive as it is untested. With only slight oversimplification, this new mythology can be put in the form of the following syllogism:

(1) Insurgent movements require popular support in order to gain momentum, and guerrilla forces require popular support in order to conduct successful military operations. Similarly, acquiring popular support by the government is essential if counter-guerrilla operations are to be successful.

(2) Neutralizing popular support for the insurgents, and acquiring it for the government, depends on providing economic and social benefits by the central government to the rural areas in which the bulk of the population lives.

(3) Therefore, socio-economic improvement programs, especially in rural areas, are essential for an effective counterinsurgency effort. **

The syllogism has undeniable appeal to those grounded in Western ideologies and values. It strikes a particularly responsive

* Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, 1965, p. 2.

** The war in Vietnam has (circa May 1965) perhaps attained a level of violence beyond the point at which adherents of the syllogism would claim that it applies. At the same time, most adherents would be inclined to say that escalation (in the form of bombing North Vietnam, and naval blockades along the coast), will not bring any significant improvement in the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam because it won't influence popular support. Rather than influencing the insurgency, escalation may simply turn that conflict into a different type of war.

chord in the populist symbols and sentiments of American traditions. But it may be stronger on symbolism and sentiment than on realism. As a basis for describing the problem, and prescribing remedies, the syllogism probably involves significant inaccuracies in both the major and minor premises, hence in the inference drawn from them. The following sections of this paper will raise some questions about the syllogism, consider an alternative approach to the analysis of insurgency, and suggest some possible inferences from the alternative approach that bear on American attitudes toward the problem, and on the design of operationally useful actions and programs in the counterinsurgency field.

II. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POPULAR SUPPORT

Consider the major premise (1). I would be inclined to argue that an opposite position is both logically and empirically tenable. An effective insurgent movement and guerrilla activity can grow and gather momentum among a population that is passive or even hostile to the movement, given the structure and nature of transitional societies in the less-developed countries. By the same token, successful counterinsurgency programs can be conducted among a rural populace that is passive or even hostile, rather than loyal, to the government.

From an operational point of view, what an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular support, in the sense of attitudes of identification, and allegiance, but rather a supply of certain inputs (e.g., food, recruits, information) at reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of coercion as well as money. These costs may be "reasonable" without popular support for the insurgents; and, conversely, the costs may be raised considerably without popular support having previously acquired by the government. This is the crux of the alternative approach that will be developed later. The point to make here is simply that the emphasis on popular support in the syllogism may be misleading. Resources that the insurgents

need from rural areas may continue to be available and at reasonable or perhaps even reduced cost, notwithstanding increased popular support for the government. Conversely, interdicting, or raising the cost of, these resource flows may be accomplished, without any increase in popular support for the government. In the actual environment of transitional societies, once an insurgent movement has attained some modest level of organization and activity, increases in popular support are indeed more likely to be the result than the cause of effective counterinsurgent action by the government.

Now consider the minor premise (2), concerning the relationship between popular support and socio-economic improvement programs. Does social and economic development increase popular support, or create antagonism (e.g., because of the inevitable insufficiency of the improvement with respect to some relevant aspiration level)? Does development reduce vulnerability to extremist movements, or facilitate their task by promoting social instability and dislocation? Does development contribute to the functioning of a more competitive, open society, or instead require such a centralization of power and control, as to conflict with liberal institutions, at least in the short run? These are basic questions that have been extensively studied and debated and, in preliminary and inconclusive ways, subjected to empirical tests.* Both questions and answers involve phenomena that are complex and imperfectly understood. At the most, it must be said that evidence to support the view that economic and social improvement programs have a predictable effect on popular support, or that the magnitude of this effect is

* Some of the pertinent references are James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas" in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, March 1959; Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change," in Development of the Emerging Countries, Robert Asher, ed., The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1962; Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, December 1963; Charles Wolf, Jr., Foreign Aid; Theory and Practice in Southern Asia (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Un. Press, 1960) Chapters 8 and 9; and "Political Effects of Economic Programs; Some Indications from Latin America," Economic Development and Cultural Change (forthcoming).

substantial, is highly inconclusive.

But from the standpoint of the problem of insurgency and counter-insurgency, there is a more important point than whether or to what extent social and economic improvement programs influence popular support. Even if such programs do increase popular support, there may be no effect, or a perverse effect, on the cost and availability of inputs that the insurgents require for their operations. As will be discussed later, the effects are likely to be sensitive to the criteria that are used in allocating such programs in rural areas. Nevertheless, for certain plausible types of criteria and programs, it is entirely possible that the effects may be perverse. The supply of what the insurgents need from the villages may increase and the costs may decline, notwithstanding improvements in popular support for the government.

The reason for this apparent paradox isn't hard to find. Economic and social development programs, while they may affect the preferences of the populace as between government and insurgents, will influence the disposable resources that the populace possesses with which to satisfy its preferences. Even if the villager's preference for the government is increased, the fact that he commands additional resources as a result of economic improvement, will very likely enable him to use more of these resources to "buy" his security or protection from the insurgent forces. Economic and social development programs in an insurgent environment thus have an income effect, as well as a substitution effect. The substitution effect may increase the villager's preference for the government; but the income effect will certainly increase the resources available to him for reaching an accommodation with the insurgents on terms that make him feel he is improving his chances of survival. Notwithstanding the existence of hostility by the rural populace toward the insurgents, an arrangement between them in which both can benefit as a result of economic and social improvement projects undertaken by the central government is a prominent possibility.

The conclusion I would draw contrasts sharply with that inferred in the syllogism. Improvement programs, developed and allocated according to the usual criteria of productivity or equity, may or may not increase popular support for the government. But whether or not there is an improvement in popular support, the effect is more likely to facilitate the growth of the insurgent movement and to increase the effectiveness of guerrilla operations, than to impede them. Rural improvement programs, in order to be of any benefit as an adjunct of counterinsurgency efforts, must be accompanied by efforts to exact something in return for whatever benefits and improvements are provided. The criterion governing the allocation of resources for such programs must explicitly relate to a kind of bargaining operation in which the government's improvement projects are exchanged for restrictions imposed on the availability of resources that the insurgency can draw from rural areas.

Quite apart from rural improvement programs, the objective of winning popular support and allegiance by a government that is combating an insurgent movement is a highly desirable goal, but it is probably too broad and too ambitious to serve as a conceptual framework for counterinsurgency programs. It is too broad because it does not help to discriminate between those government actions that hinder and those that help insurgent operations; it is too ambitious because it is beyond the capacity of an embattled central government to overcome the anti-governmental attitudes that are deeply engrained in transitional societies. In such societies, the government is traditionally viewed as an opponent rather than a collaborator: as the tax collector, or warmaker, or buyer of output (at low prices), as "they" not "us." (According to an old Burmese proverb, "The four things which cannot be trusted are thieves, the boughs of trees, women, and rulers.")

To develop modern societies, it is of course necessary to change these attitudes, but it is unrealistic to expect that they will be drastically modified in 5 or 25 years. The attitudes are too deeply engrained and the animosities and rigidities on which they are based too numerous and deep-seated to be eradicated quickly. As far as

*in Communist
territories?*

counterinsurgency is concerned, increasing popular support and political loyalty for the government by changing these attitudes is more likely to be a consequence than a cause of successful counterinsurgency. The operational problem, therefore, is how to increase the effectiveness of such counterinsurgency efforts directly; how to influence behavior and action in the short run, so that attitudes and loyalties can be altered in the long run.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Transitional societies are inherently vulnerable to insurgency. Cleavages and antagonisms are endemic and pervasive: between landlords and tenants; between urban and rural areas; among ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic groups. Inequities in the distribution of wealth, income, education and opportunity are chronic, painful and widespread. Resentment against the current or historic privilege and status enjoyed by foreigners and domestic elites is often acute or easily enflamed. Such patterns of bitterness and resentment are as much a part of the fabric of transitional societies as low income levels. To change the patterns requires far reaching changes in social, political and economic structure. If such changes come about under non-authoritarian auspices, they are likely to result only after a generation or more. If they come about under communist or other equally severe auspices they may be quicker, but they will bring with them new and harsher torments and inequities.

The heavy burden of discontent and grievance that characterizes the less-developed countries impinges on governmental and other institutions with limited and overburdened capabilities for dealing with the underlying causes. Even with good leadership and the best use of these limited capabilities, a successful attack on the causes will take time, and accomplishments will be spotty. Innumerable evils and grievances are bound to persist, and insurgent movements are likely to be able to exploit them, given a modest input of ingenuity, organization, external support, and the lure of acquiring political power. Thus, there will remain a high probability that a

critical number of people can be found in these societies willing to support and participate in an insurgent movement which combines a worthy purpose with an organization, an active life, and an opportunity for personal and collective gain. The promise of gain does not have to be much to attract those with little to lose.

Under these circumstances, the most that governments are likely to be able to do in a decade or two is to mitigate some of the more egregious sources of discontent. Some social injustices may be reduced, and economic development may be started. But inevitably, a large residue of discontent and grievance will remain. To say that transitional societies are vulnerable to insurgency is almost to state a tautology.

In this context, an approach to counterinsurgency that focusses on "winning popular support" has little chance of success. There are too many obstacles to surmount, and too many reasons why whatever support is won is likely to be lukewarm and easily alienated. A more modest approach may be at once more realistic and more useful operationally.

The alternative approach that I want to explore starts from the view that insurgent movements can properly be considered as operating systems, requiring certain inputs from either local or foreign sources, which are organized and converted into the "outputs" characterizing the active insurgency. In general, insurgency requires inputs of recruits, information, and food from the local environment; and cadres, some materiel, and funds, from external sources. To obtain the inputs that are needed from the local environment, the insurgency relies on persuasion, terror, and payments in money or services. With these inputs, the insurgent system "produces" acts of sabotage, terror, public demonstrations, small scale attacks and eventually mobile warfare, directed against the civil instrumentalities of government (e.g., village, district and provincial functionaries, public services, etc.) and against the government's military and paramilitary forces.

The problem of counterinsurgency can be divided into two parts. One part of the problem is to raise the costs and reduce the availability of the inputs that the system requires. The second part is to curtail the outputs of the system by interfering with the process by which inputs are converted into outputs, and by directly blocking or destroying the outputs. Military measures are the principle means of directly meeting and curtailing the system's outputs. Economic, social and political programs, as well as military efforts, are needed to impede the supply of inputs to the system.

Concerning the military, "output-oriented" programs, one point appears clear from counterinsurgency experience in Malaya, the Philippines, and Algeria. The military programs needed to curtail active insurgency require large quantities of manpower; they are labor-intensive, rather than capital-intensive programs. The large numbers are reflected by the familiar ratio of 10 counterinsurgents to 1 insurgent, a ratio that is often cited, although usually without too clear a picture of what should be included in either numerator or denominator.*

In designing the non-military, "input-oriented" measures, explicit consideration should be given to whether and how a particular activity is likely to impede the flow of inputs to the insurgents. Projects and policies that might be desirable under normal circumstances may be quite inappropriate in an insurgent environment because they would not increase the insurgents' costs of obtaining the inputs they need. Indeed, policies that would increase rural income by raising food prices, or projects that would increase agricultural productivity through distribution of fertilizer or livestock, may be of negative value in an on-going insurgency. As noted earlier, such projects and programs may

* A number of interesting questions, that won't be discussed here arise in connection with these military programs: for example, the types of weaponry and forces; the efficient mix between military and paramilitary units; tradeoffs between manpower and equipment, and between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the conduct of these programs, etc.

actually facilitate guerrilla operations by increasing the availability of inputs that the insurgents need.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

What difference would such an approach make? It may be worthwhile to consider the differences at two distinct levels: the first, relating to our general attitude toward the governments we collaborate with in counterinsurgency programs; the second, relating to specific operational suggestions for dealing with insurgency problems.

Because Americans typically start from the view that I have described as the "popular-support" view, we frequently feel a bit uncomfortable in the efforts we engage in with established governments to combat insurgency. Notwithstanding our awareness of the reality of communist subversion and the techniques of "liberation war," the populist tradition in American history frequently disposes us to a feeling of identification with the insurgent ethos. The initial role of a Castro evokes more sympathy with Americans than that of a Batista. Castro, struggling in the Sierra Maestra, could be easily seen as a popular, Jacksonian crusader for the common man and against the entrenched interests; Batista fitted equally well the role of the ruthless, exploitative tyrant. That there was reality as well as appearance in this role-casting is not the point. The point is that the emotional reaction of Americans to insurgencies frequently interferes with a realistic assessment of alternatives, and inclines us instead toward a carping righteousness in our relations with the beleaguered government we are ostensibly supporting.

Moreover, when we find that our initial effort to support an established government in quelling an insurgency turns out less than a smashing success, our disposition to accept and to advocate the "popular-support" view provides a way for us to extenuate our poor showing. Casting the established government in the role of tyrant, vested interest and exploiter ^{offers the temptation} ~~permits us~~ to deflect the blame for

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possibly
ineffectual performance from our own bad advice and assistance, and to place it instead on the misconduct of the established government. Something of this general mood became increasingly influential in molding our relationships with Diem and his regime in Vietnam in late 1962 and 1963.

The effect of such an atmospheric change is that we become a hostile and captious critic of the established regime and the regime begins to regard us as an adversary rather than a collaborator. In the process, we tend to lose whatever influence and leverage we might otherwise have had to bring about modest, but important improvements in programs and policies. Because we tend to expend effort and exhaust good will in a querulous homily about the need to gain mass popular support, we are inclined to miss opportunities to bring about piecemeal and gradual improvements in counterinsurgency programs.

Examples?

It is by no means far-fetched to imagine that this same sequence might ensue in our efforts to improve and extend counterinsurgency programs in Thailand or elsewhere in the future. We may begin with an awareness that the insurgency movement is in part traceable to communist organization and resources, as well as to internal sources of grievance and discontent. But as we find that the problem persists or even grows worse, we may be increasingly disposed to cast the established regime in the familiar role of a villain, whose inability to acquire popular support among the people is inescapably evidenced by the persistence of insurgency.

This is not to deny that many of the governments that we have to deal with do in fact possess some of these evil characteristics. But, to repeat, the point is that our disposition to accept the "popular support" view of the problem often makes us too prone to look for overly broad and ambitious "social-transformation" solutions, and to overlook the more modest, realistic and sometimes distasteful measures that may improve the situation step by step.

At the level of specific operational suggestions, what sorts of measures might be inferred from the alternative approach we have been exploring? The following paragraphs present some specific illustrations,

some of them based on the experience and methods used by President Magsaysay in waging effective counterinsurgency against the Hukbalahap in the Philippines in the early 1950s. Their unifying theme is that they are primarily directed toward influencing behavior, rather than attitudes, by raising the costs and reducing the availabilities of inputs needed by the insurgency movement.

1. Food Supplies

If one were to look at the specific problem of reducing the availability of food to feed the insurgency, several measures might be worth considering. Civil or military units of the established government might try to buy up rural food supplies in order to deny them to the insurgents. Preemptive buying of this sort clearly would entail a risk. The risk is that the rural supplier of food would get more in return for output made available to the government, and this might simply have the effect of increasing the disposable income available to him which the insurgents could then tax. However, payment for the food might be accomplished through barter transactions using other consumer's goods, such as textiles or tobacco, which are valuable to the rural population as consumers, but are of relatively little value to the insurgents. Under these circumstances, it might be possible to preempt food supplies without simply providing the insurgents with additional income to use in buying food on the open market. A preemptive buying program, using barter as payment, might seriously complicate the logistics of insurgent operations.

2. Recruitment

As an operating social system, an insurgent movement typically draws its recruits from the locale in which it operates. The local recruits are attracted for various reasons: the worthy causes associated with the insurgent movement; the desire to redress social injustices; the adventure associated with guerrilla activity and the possibility of personal advancement, in contrast to the tedium and stagnation of village life. Threats and coercion are used selectively, but severely, to make these attractions effective; in general, the greater

the attractions, the less coercion must be expended by the insurgents to obtain needed recruits.

A number of measures might make recruitment less attractive and, by influencing the hypothetical men at the margin, reduce the supply of recruits, cause the insurgency to expend more coercion, and thereby complicate and obstruct insurgent operations. Some of these measures relate to improving the supply of information to the government so that guerrilla units can be more effectively harassed, and hence recruitment becomes less attractive. These measures will be discussed later. Other measures, which will be briefly illustrated here, may operate on recruitment (and defection) without necessarily affecting informational inputs.

For example, the supply of recruits might be impeded by a judicious use of the system Magsaysay used in the Philippines for motivating government forces to kill Huks: a promotion and a personal letter of praise to the effective government units from the President himself. Clearly, the dangers of a miscarriage of this system can be substantial. Used by a Batista the results might be quite different from those achieved by Magsaysay. Nevertheless, some method of providing rewards for effective military action against insurgents may make a useful contribution both to motivating successful actions by government forces, and making the prospect of guerrilla service less attractive to prospective recruits.

Political!

Another measure that was used effectively in the Philippines was the amnesty and resettlement program for defecting Huks. Under the EDCOR program, defecting Huks were resettled in Mindanao under terms that compared very favorably with economic conditions prevailing in Central Luzon: land, fertilizer, agricultural implements and working capital were part of the package. Of course, there is a danger that the inducements might be made too attractive; villagers might join up with the insurgents in order to realize the benefits resulting from subsequent defection!*

However, the dilemma may be more apparent than real. The problem is how to make the life of a guerrilla look unattractive so that recruitment will be hindered, while at the same time making defection appear relatively more attractive than the life of an insurgent so that those who do join are seriously tempted to defect. There is probably a wide range within which the effectiveness

* As reportedly occurred in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising.

of amnesty and resettlement programs can be developed to increase the frequency of defection without increasing the supply of recruits to the insurgent movement. In Vietnam, for example, the Chieu Hoi program (which has as its primary aim the motivation and re-habilitation of the rallies [defectors]) surely operates so far within this range that it could improve its content and performance substantially without running any risk that it might stimulate recruits to join the Vietcong!

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To take another example, the life of a recruit might be made less appealing if the insurgents had fewer weapons to pass out to recruits. At the start of his counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines, Magsaysay offered a reward of 75 pesos (\$38) for each serviceable, unlicensed weapon returned to the government, and no questions asked. Buying up weapons, without inflicting any penalty on the person bringing the weapon, could have an effect in reducing the firepower available to the insurgents and making the life of a guerrilla less attractive. Again, there would be a risk in such a measure: government units might simply contrive to lose their weapons more frequently. However, guarding against this danger should not be too difficult. Some system of reward or promotions for government troops that retain their weapons in combat, and of severe penalties against government forces that "lose" their weapons under noncombat conditions, could limit this danger.

3. Information

Effective counterinsurgency requires both improvement in the supply of information to the government, and interference with the supply of information to the insurgents. To some extent, the two efforts may be complementary. If incentives to provide information to the government were made stronger, our hypothetical man "on the fence" might be induced to follow this line of behavior rather than that of providing information to the insurgents. To the extent that the two efforts are independent, the problem is more difficult. But if they are independent, it is easier to think of ways by which the supply of information to the government might be increased (and these are what

the following comments will concentrate on) than to think of ways by which the supply of information to the insurgents can be choked off. The one permits greater use of the carrot, the other tends to invoke the stick, and is a nastier route to travel. The need to use the stick if the supply of information to the insurgents is to be impeded raises the fundamental question, which will be discussed later, concerning the importance of discipline in the counterinsurgency forces, and the need to assure that severity is exercised with restraint in their operational modes. However, to reduce the supply of information to the insurgents those who have been identified as informers on government forces and units, must be treated with severity. This, of course, is easier to say quickly, than to do wisely; it runs the inevitable risk of excessive, misdirected and counterproductive cruelty by government forces. Nevertheless, the point is important to recognize. As long as a fundamental asymmetry prevails in which information given to the government carries with it a high probability of quick and ruthless reprisal by the insurgents, while information given to the insurgents carries no such risk, the supply of information to the insurgents is likely to be more abundant than to the government.

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Turning to measures for increasing the supply of information to the government, the Philippine experience again is instructive. For example, President Magsaysay instituted as one of his earliest counterinsurgency measures a system of substantial rewards for information leading to the capture of Huks: 500 pesos (\$250) for enlisted men, and 5000 pesos (\$2500) for top leaders like Taruc, Lava and Alejandrino (the lower of these figures was more than two and one half times the annual per capita income then prevailing in the Philippines).

The British in suppressing the communist rebellion in Malaya also made extensive use of income payments to acquire information about communist guerrillas and officers. For example, it was not unusual for a Tamil rubber tapper to clear \$25,000 if he provided hard information concerning the whereabouts of four or five communist

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guerrillas, and a district committee member.

Clearly, if such an incentive system has any effect in uncovering really useful information, the cost would be modest. In Vietnam, for example, one might ask the question, "What is the 'price' of a Vietcong?" If genuinely useful information could be obtained for \$300 or more per head, the results could be quite dramatic at small cost. With a total force between 50,000 and 100,000 only a small fraction would have to be located to create a seriously demoralizing effect on the insurgency's recruitment program. (And what, incidentally, would be the price at which the leaders of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, such as Nguyen Huu Tho, could be located? It might well be less than the price that Magsaysay used for locating top Huk leaders in the Philippines.).*

Clearly, an incentive program of this sort places heavy burdens on the Intelligence system of the established government to screen misinformation and keep the effort from going amiss. Among other precautions, a reasonably careful system of prisoner interrogation, combined with a disciplined effort to be skeptical about the information received, would be advisable. Finally, as a vital part of these measures to improve the supply of information to the government, and reduce the supply to the insurgents, it is essential to provide protection for the individual or villages that give useful information on the location and operation of the insurgents. Otherwise the intended incentives will turn out to be unintended disincentives.

4. External Inputs and the Need to "Close" Contiguous Borders

As noted earlier, some of the inputs that are important for the functioning of an insurgent system, are usually provided from abroad.

* Another type of information that might be expanded by offering high prices concerns the location of small arms and ammunition factories which, at some stage of the insurgent movement, typically are set up in the area of operations. Here the dangers of misinformation and of a miscarriage of the effort are less than where the information concerns particular insurgents, whose identity may be more subject to question.

The quantities that are involved are usually very small in numbers or in tonnage, although their importance (e.g., as cadre, money, and some types of materiel) may be considerable. Where these inputs can be provided to the insurgency movement from a contiguous border area, the logistics of external support becomes relatively simple and the interdiction of this support difficult.

One does not need to deny the major importance of the inputs that are obtained locally, to advance the proposition that interdicting logistic support from contiguous border areas is a necessary although not a sufficient condition for a counterinsurgency effort to succeed. In all cases where counterinsurgency efforts are generally considered to have been effective, there was either no contiguous land border (e.g., the Philippines) or the border was substantially closed off (e.g., Malaya and Greece). Insurgent movements may succeed in areas that lack a contiguous land border (e.g., Cuba), but they are much more likely to succeed in areas (e.g., Vietnam, Laos, and conceivably Thailand) where a contiguous border region provides an easy source of logistic support for the insurgent movement.

Of course, there is a substantial operational problem in closing off a long contiguous border, particularly when the logistic support that is occurring is likely to be quite modest in scale. The method of inflicting countervailing military or economic penalties on the country of origin (for example, the recent American and South Vietnamese bombing raids in North Vietnam), may be more efficient than manning a six or seven hundred mile border 24 hours a day. But bombing as a means of inflicting such penalties is likely to encounter some operational difficulties as well as political problems. One difficulty is that the logistic support may be turned off and on much more readily than the bombing attacks. Perhaps there may be other ways of inflicting penalties on the points of origin that are less subject to the political limitations of air bombardment. For example, one mischievous effort to raise the cost of externally provided supplies might lie in introducing large quantities of counterfeit money, ration cards, identity cards, etc.,

to the contiguous point of origin, for example, North Vietnam. The disruptive effect on the society and economy might be greater, although admittedly the psychological and symbolic effect would be less, than aerial bombardment.

These suggestions all relate to particular inputs and sources of inputs that an insurgency system requires, and to possible measures for raising the costs of obtaining them. In addition to the specific measures, there are two broad instruments which have a wider and more general relevance in the design and implementation of counterinsurgency programs. The first concerns the discipline of government military and paramilitary forces; the second to the allocation of social and economic improvement programs as adjuncts of the counterinsurgency effort.

5. Military Discipline

As noted earlier, one of the more crippling impediments to effective counterinsurgency programs ^{generally lies in} ~~is often~~ the wanton abuse of power by the government's military and paramilitary forces. The difficulties resulting from the abuses committed by these forces are not simply that support for and confidence in the government is weakened. The more serious reason that infractions of military discipline are counter-productive is that they are either randomized or arbitrary. Hence, it becomes impossible for the populace to infer anything about the relationship between the harsh conduct of the government forces and the behavior of the villagers themselves. No

Military discipline must be tightened and brought under firm control so that such harshness as is meted out by government forces is unambiguously recognizable as a penalty deliberately imposed because of behavior by the populace that contributes to the insurgent movement. On the other hand, protection and support must be provided by the government military forces for individuals and villages that act in ways that assist the counterinsurgency effort. The problem is not simply that military

discipline must be strengthened in order to avoid capricious and unnecessary additions to the already large inventory of grievance and discontent; discipline must be strengthened mainly to amplify the signals that the government is trying to convey to the people concerning the kinds of behavior that it wishes to promote and the kind that it wishes to discourage.

NO

The progress of an insurgency movement inevitably increases the likelihood of misbehavior by government military forces as a frustration reaction that in turn strengthens the insurgency itself. To meet this problem in the Philippines, Magsaysay instituted a military Complaint Office with striking results. To bring military discipline under effective control, the victim of any offense or abuse by the military was urged to report the incident. Following the report, an airplane from the Complaint Office arrived at the incident and an investigation was held within two hours of receipt of the complaint. Rapid and effective action, combined with severe penalties against the offenders, followed. The aim was to remove one of the more pressing and obvious sources of injustice and hostility, and also to reduce the "noise" impeding the government's communication with the populace.

6. Economic and Social Improvement Programs

Just as improvements in military discipline are an important adjunct of counterinsurgency efforts, so economic and social improvement programs can make a useful contribution. But, as noted earlier, the crucial point is to connect a particular program with the kind of behavior the government wants to promote among the people. Whether a program involves livestock, fertilizer, windmills, seeds, or farm-to-market roads or education, the choice and location of projects should reflect the principle of rewarding the villages that cooperate with the government and that withhold or limit the provision of inputs to the insurgents. It is also fundamental that economic and social improvement programs must be combined with military protection of the cooperating rural areas, if incentives for cooperation are to be strengthened.

There is another way in which social and economic improvement programs can influence the availability of inputs needed by the insurgents. One reason why it is difficult to restrict these inputs is that the points of origin are typically numerous and dispersed. Less-developed countries are usually "plural" economic and social entities in the sense that they contain many units that are functionally and technologically, as well as physically, remote from one another. Villages, districts, towns, provinces and urban centers typically operate in very imperfect contact, and occasionally in isolation from one another, and, in particular, from the capital city and the institutions of the central government concentrated there. Thus, flows of commodities, information and people across these different units are extremely limited.

Because the links and contacts among these enclaves, and between them and the center, are so meager, the government's ability to maintain surveillance and to establish control over the flow of inputs to an insurgency is accordingly limited. Under these circumstances, a relevant consideration for choosing economic and social improvement projects is the extent to which different types will provide links and instruments for restricting input flows to the guerrillas. From this standpoint, projects that provide schools, dispensaries, roads and other social services may be more effective than would economically more productive projects, for example, in agricultural development. Preferred projects, including perhaps civic action projects by the military, are those that strengthen or expand the instruments available to the government for obtaining information and controlling insurgent logistics.

The two approaches to choosing economic and social projects differ, but they are closely related and should be mutually reinforcing. In one case, choice is based on providing rewards for the kind of behavior the government is trying to promote and, by withholding benefits and projects, providing penalties for the kind of behavior that the government is trying to discourage. In the second case,

choice is based on the extent to which particular projects in specific locations can forge the links that increase the government's ability to restrict the flow of inputs to the insurgency.

V. CONCLUSION

The difference between the usual emphasis on popular support, and the alternative approach discussed here is admittedly only a difference of degree. But degrees are often important, and at least two degrees of difference should be repeated in conclusion. At a broad, conceptual level, the main concern of insurgency efforts should be to influence the behavior and action of the populace rather than their loyalties and attitudes. Altering loyalties and attitudes is a long-run goal, to be achieved only gradually and with difficulty. It can be dramatically encouraged by the charismatic appeal of a Magsaysay, as an individual and a personality. But charismatic leadership is not a commodity that can be easily produced.* However, even without this rare attribute, improvements can be made. The leadership of countries in which insurgent movements appear can do much to influence the behavior and actions of the populace in ways that will make the operation of the insurgent system substantially more difficult, and will facilitate successful implementation of counterinsurgency programs.

Troop
behavior?
Election in
Philippines?
Econ appeals;
land, water;
Complaints
Officer?
Indulgence,
- Mulya?

At the operational level of specific programs and measures to prevent or control the growth of insurgency, the main thrust of the approach we have been describing is to focus attention on the difficulties (or opportunities) that would be created for the insurgent system by implementation of a proposed program or measure. The issue may concern fertilizer distribution or windmill construction, civic action programs or military patrols; or the problem at hand may

* Although it can be helped along in a number of ways. For some indications, see Jose V. Abueva, "Bridging the Gap between the Elite and the People in the Philippines," in Geiger and Solomon (eds.) Motivations and Methods in Development and Foreign Aid, Washington, D. C., 1964, and Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story, New York, 1956.

relate to economic and social programs, information and intelligence-gathering programs, or direct military operations. But in all such cases, the primary question should be whether the proposed measure is likely to increase the cost and difficulties of insurgent operations, rather than whether it wins popular loyalty and support, or whether it contributes to a more productive and "efficient" use of resources or a more equitable distribution of income and wealth.

What of ^{practices} operating doctrines of our military?

Attitudes Woff describes relate primarily to AW's rationale for aid.

Ignores police problems; role of terrorism.

Games People

Play, Eric

Berne, M.D.,

NY: Grove Press,

1964.

MEMORANDUM

5/27

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. K. K. K.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

24 May 1965

I-651165

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL VOGT

SUBJECT: A New Look at Viet Nam

The attached draft will be delivered by Charles Wolf of RAND at the Airlie House Conference on 4 and 5 June 1965.

It is provocative and highly relevant, and we thought you might like to read through it. Wolf will be in on 1 June should you want to talk with him further.

John H. Cotten

John H. Cotten

Captain, U. S. Navy

Chief, Special Studies Div.

*John - I have read it
it is excellent!
those wolf makes
a dent at airlie -
John*